

Rio 2016 Organizing Committee

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GSMUN XVII



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Boas-vindas, Delegates!

It is our distinct pleasure to welcome you to the Rio 2016 Olympic Organizing Committee. Just as the Olympic Organizing Committee has dedicated countless hours and dollars to prepare for Rio 2016, we too have prepared tirelessly and spent lavishly (the latter somewhat less so) to ring in GSMUN XVII. The challenges you will face in this committee will be complex and plentiful: how best can Rio 2016 develop necessary infrastructure without intruding on the rights of Rio's citizens? What can we do to keep athletes, spectators, and citizens safe? How can we ensure that the legacy of the Olympics in Rio is positive and long-lasting?

Without any further ado, let us tell you a little bit about ourselves:

Coly Elhai, a junior, has been active in Maggie Walker Model UN for four years and has enjoyed every bit of it. She was delegate on the Future Joint Crisis: North Korea committee at GSMUN XIV and wreaked havoc as a crisis staffer for the Ad-Hoc Committee on Bioethics and the Crisis: Yom Kippur War committee at GSMUN's XV and XVI. Last year, she also chaired the House Committee on Foreign Relations at Walker Model Congress. When she's not delving into the intricacies of national and international issues, you can sometimes find her playing violin for the Richmond Philharmonic, acting, or competing with the forensics team. Coly is also a proud member of Maggie Walker's Pugwash Club, which does not, in fact, wash small dogs.

A junior, Helen Li has been involved with Model UN since her 6th grade year. Like her co-chair and partner-in-crime, she was a delegate at GSMUN XIV, representing Germany in SOCHUM. She worked on the fundraising and crisis staffs during GSMUN XV, and was vice-chair for the Arab League at GSMUN XVI. In addition, Helen loves discussing politics and ethics in Model Congress and Pugwash, though she too refrains from washing small dogs. She also participates in Future Problem Solvers and serves as Forensics team's co-"Pieckeeper", with, of course, Coly Elhai. At home, Helen likes to cook delicious food, make wire jewelry, and read science fiction. Her favorite TV shows include *The Big Bang Theory*, *Modern Family*, *Once Upon a Time*, and *The Legend of Korra*.

Your position paper should be more than 500 words in 12-pt Times New Roman, double-spaced. Please give a biography of the person you are representing, followed by an analysis of and opinions on the issues raised in this background guide. A few pointers to help you along:

- Do your best to stay true to whatever positions your character holds. Remember, in the context of this committee, you are the person you have been assigned to represent.
- We are interested to see your own work, not the work of whoever you might find on the Internet. Plagiarism has no place at GSMUN.
- Most of all, have fun with your paper! The more you research and the more prepared you are before you even arrive to the committee, the more enjoyable the entire conference will be.

Feel free to contact us at gsmun17.rioolympics@gmail.com if you have any comments, questions, concerns, confusion, criticisms, kudos, etc. We would be more than willing to assist you in any way we can.

Boa sorte!

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Urban Renewal

Hosting a huge international sporting event can be staggeringly expensive. The host city must invest not only in enormous stadiums, but also in the infrastructure to house and transport thousands of athletes, tens of thousands of journalists, and hundreds of thousands of spectators. The Rio 2016 Olympics are no exception. Brazil plans to spend \$11.5 billion worth of public funds on the Olympics, and intends to spend an additional \$14 billion on facilities and infrastructure for the 2014 World Cup that will then be used for the Olympics as well.

The Olympic Development Authority (ODA) is the group tasked with putting that money to work by “coordinat[ing] public services and deliver[ing] infrastructure” for Rio 2016. It will supervise construction and renewal projects and ensure coordination between the three branches of Brazilian government. Planners of the Rio 2016 Olympics hope to leave a legacy of environmental awareness, so working within the ODA will be a sub-organization called the Olympic Sustainability Division. The OSD will be responsible for the policy for, planning of, and research into the Games’ environmental impact. It will also be in charge of integrating Rio 2016’s environment projects, including reinvigorating Rio’s waterways through water treatment and education, using renewable sources of energy, monitoring energy consumption, and making the Games carbon-neutral by planting millions of trees in and around Rio, thus reforesting sections of rain forests.

Transportation poses another challenge to the Olympic Development Authority. In the absence of substantial public transport infrastructure, even the needs of Rio’s current population of 6.2 million overwhelm the road network. The city plans to accommodate its citizens and the many

Olympic spectators by building a new underground line to supplement the two lines already in existence. Rio will also create four dedicated bus lanes that will cover a total of 93 miles.

The Olympic Development Authority will oversee the construction of sports venues as well (Candidature File, p 42). Permanent venues will include the Olympic Training Center, the Olympic and Paralympic Villages, and an X Park that will host cycling and canoeing events. After the games, the usage of permanent venues will continue in a variety of ways. Some will transition into public use, and others will be leased to private sports clubs or to private corporations. Olympic officials emphasize, though, that the money spent on the Olympics is an investment that will reap rewards even after the Olympics are over. President of the International Olympic Committee Jacques Rogge said, "Definitely we'll have to explain very clearly to all the public that the investments made for the Olympic Games is going to give a sustainable legacy for generations to come."

One place in which the government hopes to leave a sustainable legacy is Rio’s slums, also known as favelas. Favela residents, who make up about a third of Rio’s population, have no legal basis for their housing, paying no taxes and owning their land unofficially. These communities sprang up in the late 19th century when the Brazilian government failed to fulfill its promise to provide veterans from the Canudos campaign with housing. The veterans had to settle informally instead, and were soon joined by the many poor migrant workers who had come to the city as a result of Brazil’s rapid urbanization. Favelas were defined in 1950 to be areas having more than 50 “rustic shacks” lived in without land titles in an area lacking public services (water, sanitation, plumbing,

electricity, telephone, or police) and without paved streets. Now, though, it is common for residents of favelas to pirate electricity, running water, and other services from the national grid or other sources. There are currently 600 favelas in Rio, most of them controlled by drug trafficking groups and very unsafe as a result. Many of these favelas are adjacent to more affluent communities that also feel the effects of favela crime.

The government is taking a number of steps to upgrade Rio's favelas ahead of the 2016 Olympics. In 2008, the National Congress launched a program called *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP), or Police Pacification Unit, with the goal of taking back territories controlled by drug factions. With UPP units (described in more detail in the defense briefing) working to pacify the favelas, technicians can now enter the favelas to provide services such as reliable electricity and cell service. Another government program, the Growth Acceleration Program 2 (PAC 2), provides funds for the construction of new homes, clinics, libraries, and even monorail lines to benefit favela residents. "We are a developing country which needs a massive investment in infrastructure...The World Cup and Olympics give us a golden opportunity to invest and accelerate such projects," explained Brazil's Vice Minister for Sport Luis Fernandes. However, some community leaders fear that the progress being made now will be unsustainable if not accompanied by investments in job creation and education.

Others also have complaints about the government's approach to development and construction. Construction workers hired to build Olympic stadiums, disgruntled that they are being paid low wages despite Brazil's low unemployment rate and booming economy, often threaten to strike for higher pay. Threatened and realized strikes have led to delays at several stadium construction sites.

Brazil's populace is also dissatisfied with the government's money management ahead of the Olympics. The billions of dollars

the government has spent for the upcoming sporting events have only benefited a few companies. Meanwhile, ordinary Brazilians feel that the government has ignored their problems, including the high food and labor costs resulting from the nation's 6.5% annual interest rate.

Over a million Brazilians took to the streets in summer 2013 hoping to bring attention to their economic concerns and encourage the government to improve the quality and availability of public services. As one protestor explained her dissatisfaction, "The government is spending billions on stadiums when we need investment to improve our appalling health and education systems."

Corruption in the Brazilian government was another of the protestors' grievances. In Brazil, "everything is a pretext for corruption," said Gil Castello Branco, the head of an NGO called Contas Abertas that monitors public spending. It is common for public works projects to be completed late, over budget, and of low quality due in part to the culture of kickbacks and cronyism that is prevalent among government officials. An example of this occurred during construction for the 2007 Pan American Games held in Brazil. Costs for the Games are estimated to have been six times the \$177 million budget, and construction was so rushed that certain roads put in place for the games collapsed less than a year after they were built. Regarding fears that construction for the Rio Olympics would come to a similar fate, Eduardo Paes, Rio's current mayor, said "Everything is ahead of schedule." However, as of August 2013, the organizing committee for the 2016 Olympics was already \$700 million over budget, making it seem likely that the road to readying Rio for the Olympics will be a bumpy one.

Displacement

Although in some favelas, Olympic planners are working to improve the homes of residents, in others they are trying to

destroy them altogether. Informal communities already occupy much of the land on which planners intend to construct stadiums and housing, and most of the people in these communities are far from eager to leave their homes.

Rio de Janeiro has a history of evictions. In the 1960s and 70s, when a military dictatorship ruled Brazil, the government destroyed favelas in more upscale areas and relocated their residents to the far off Cidade de Deus. More recently, the government has also carried out evictions unrelated to the Olympics or World Cup, often informing residents that they will be displaced simply by marking their homes for removal. Brazilian activists estimate 170,000 people face eviction because of construction for the World Cup and Olympics. Government officials claim that all evictions performed are necessary, legal, and accompanied with compensation and new housing for the evicted, but non-government sources disagree about the justice of the evictions. “[The World Cup and Olympics] were supposed to celebrate Brazil’s accomplishments, but the opposite is happening,” said Christopher Gaffney, a professor at Fluminense Federal University in Rio. “We’re seeing an insidious pattern of trampling on the rights of the poor.”

However, the residents the government is trying to force out have been fighting the government’s plans legally, in the streets, and in the media. In the Metrô favela, residents refused to move and now live in the remains of their bulldozed homes. Residents of other favelas try desperately to protect their homes by bringing attention to their problem on YouTube and Twitter, using handheld video cameras to film evictions., Brazil’s strong, independent news media, unusual in Latin America, has also helped publicize the residents’ cause.

One of the biggest successes for favela residents has been in Vila Autódromo, a settlement of 4,000 people that the government wanted to tear down to build an

Olympic Park and connecting roadways. The favela had been threatened for years, but through many court cases and organized protests, residents had managed to keep the community intact. In August 2013, residents were rewarded with a permanent solution when Mayor Eduardo Paes agreed to a compromise regarding the community. Following organized protests against the forced evictions and meetings with the residents association and the Popular Committee on the World Cup and the Olympics (an advocacy group whose goal is to defend housing rights), Paes declared that residents of the favela would have the choice either to stay or take advantage of government-provided housing that will be built just 500 meters from the Vila Autódromo. People living in Rio’s other favelas can only hope that a similar agreement can be made elsewhere.

The evictions in Rio draw uncomfortable parallels with the human rights abuses that occurred in Beijing prior to the 2008 Olympics. Hundreds of thousands of people were evicted and their homes demolished to make room for Olympic infrastructure, with those who opposed the evictions often beaten or imprisoned. In some areas, authorities erected walls and screens in front of neighborhoods and shopping areas they considered to be eyesores, hurting businesses and threatening residents’ lifestyles. There are even reports that the government paid neighbors to act as surveillance and that doctors were strong-armed into refusing care to those who refused to move. So far, it appears as though Rio 2016 organizers are working to avoid abuses of this magnitude, but the potential for more harm to Rio’s residents still looms large.

As a member of the Rio 2016 planning committee, you have many challenges to overcome. You must meet citizens’ demands for justice and the protection of their rights even as you make the city safer and more accessible for the coming flood of visitors. You must ease labor

tensions while ensuring that construction continues on schedule. You must protect Rio's and the Olympics' reputations against allegations of corruption and mismanagement so that both institutions can emerge from the 2016 Games stronger than before. These are difficult tasks, but tasks that can be accomplished through diplomacy and careful consideration.

Questions to Consider

1. How can you ensure that Rio's transportation system will be able to handle its guests during the Olympics?
2. How can the Olympics' legacy of infrastructure be sustained and remain valuable to Rio's citizens after the Olympics?
3. In what ways can sustainable progress be made to improve life in favelas?
4. How much influence can and should favela residents have in the fate of their communities? In what ways should they be able to work with Olympics planners?
5. Can the government justify to its people that spending on Olympic stadiums is more worthwhile than spending on public services?
6. Should the demands of construction workers for more compensation be met?
7. How can corruption be avoided?
8. What can be done to keep Olympics spending on budget and on time?
9. In what cases, if any, is it acceptable for the government to displace residents to meet construction needs?
10. How should displaced residents be compensated?
11. How can Brazil protect its image and that of the Olympics in the wake of mass evictions?

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- Rio 2016's candidature file; includes more than you would ever need to know about the finances for the Olympics, sustainability goals, transportation, post-Games facilities uses, and more.
- <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/world/americas/brazil-faces-obstacles-in-preparations-for-rio-olympics.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>
 - An overview of Rio's labor and displacement problems
- <http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/front-page/economic-worries-stoke-brazil-protests/> – Investigation of the reasons behind Rio's recent protests and overview of Brazilians' economic complaints
- <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19206308> – Includes Brazilian government official's optimistic hopes for hosting the Olympics, discusses infrastructure goals for Rio
- <http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/plans-for-rio-favelas-to-get-facelift/> – Details on Rio's plans for rejuvenating its favelas
- <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2091817,00.html> – Closer view of how favela renewal is playing out in the favelas themselves
- <http://www.policymic.com/articles/5270/unlike-china-s-2008-olympics-displaced-slum-dwellers-in-brazil-will-not-go-quietly> – An opinion piece discussing the effect of Rio's and Beijing's politics on Olympic planning and the differences in the two cities' approaches to the eviction of slum-dwellers
- <http://rionwatch.org/> – Provides detailed community reporting on protests, evictions, and other issues of concern to Rio's citizens

Security

Introduction

Security is always an important issue for international sporting events. For Rio de Janeiro, the 2016 Summer Olympic Games will not only be an opportunity to further Brazil's credibility and status on the world stage, but also an opportunity to resolve Brazil's internal infrastructure and safety problems. In anticipation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games, the government implemented new security measures such as police pacification units in Rio's *favela* slums to combat drug violence and homicide rates. Security may become a problem with the widespread public protests of high costs, such as those that occurred earlier during the Confederations Cup in 2013. Thus, it is vital to discuss ways to ensure that security measures are effective and sustainable.

History

Out of the previously held 20 Summer and 21 Winter Olympiads, only in two instances has the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decided to cancel the Games due to security threats. In 1916, in the midst of World War I, the IOC cancelled the VI Summer Olympiad, originally scheduled in Berlin, Germany. For similar reasons, during World War II, the IOC cancelled the 1940 Summer and Winter Olympiads in Tokyo and Sapporo, Japan, respectively, and the 1944 Summer and Winter Olympiads in London, England, and Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy, respectively. However, other security problems such as the 1972 Munich Hostage Crisis, clearly illustrate that security in large scale events like these is undisputedly one of the biggest matters of concern. During the Munich Olympic Games in Germany, the Palestinian terrorist group Black September took nine hostages after breaking into the Olympic village and killing two Israeli

members. Ultimately, all nine hostages died, along with five members of the terrorist group and one policeman. For the success of the Olympic Games, ensuring the security of attendees is undeniably important.

Olympic Security in Rio

The crime rates in Rio de Janeiro are one of the highest in the world. In 2005, there were 42 homicides per 100,000. Most recently in 2012, there were 24 homicides per 100,000. One third of Rio's population lives in *favelas*, or slums, that lack basic infrastructure such as water, electricity, and paved roads. The dearth of infrastructure and the problems of isolation result in a lack of policing resources. Therefore, drug factions control most *favelas*. In these slums, violence is prevalent due to the constant fight over territory and positions between the drug factions. The police receive low pay; with no motivation, they seek to find income elsewhere, and as a result take bribes from drug traffickers. Some regard *favelas* as "ungovernable neighborhoods."

Combating Crime

In 2008, the National Congress launched two programs to help combat Brazil's crime rates: the Favela Pacification Program (FPP) and the *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP) or Police Pacification Unit. The UPP's primary goal is to take back territories controlled by drug factions, mainly consisting of Rio's *favelas*. The UPP follows a three-step process to slowly regain control of these "ungovernable neighborhoods." First, the Military Police Battalion (BOPE) on Urban Warfare begins to increase its searches in a *favela* for drugs and guns. Next, the BOPE surrounds and attempts to occupy the *favela*. After the BOPE secures the *favela*, a residential police force, the UPP, comes in and replaces the BOPE. The first UPP

installation occurred in December 2008 in Santa Marta. By 2011, the UPP successfully occupied 17 *favela* communities, with the hope of reaching 40 by the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

Brazil's Experience with Past Events

Although practice does not always make perfect, it certainly helps gain experience. Prior to the 2016 XXI Summer Olympic and XV Paralympic Games, Brazil had the opportunity to host the 2007 Pan-American Games, the 2013 Confederation Cup, and the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Thus, policies can be tested, seeing what works and what needs improvement. In the 2007 Pan-American Games, the government employed 20,000 police officers especially for the Games, with no significant problems. In order to ensure maximum security, during the 2013 Confederation Cup, Brazil's Intelligence Agency (ABIN) operated 24 hours a day. The government also set up a National Intelligence Center and five regional centers, where each center gathered individuals from the Federal Police, Armed Forces, and Federal Revenue Service to constantly monitor conditions in the situation room. Each of the host cities for the Cup underwent an evaluation, with assessments of all stadiums, airports, training centers, and hotels. Officials then sent confidential reports and recommendations to the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense, along with local and state governments. There were also credential checks for the 200,000 names connected to the Confederation Cup.

12 cities in Brazil will host the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In preparation for this event, the Brazilian police plan to use facial recognition technology equipped in special glasses. The small camera installed in these futuristic glasses can capture 400 facial images per second. The camera then sends these facial images to a central computer database. When the camera compares the recognition facial points and finds a match to any known criminals, a red signal appears on a small screen, alerting the police to take further

action. The camera's powers will be useful during large events due to its capability to scan faces in crowds up to 50 meters, or if adjusted, 12 miles away.

Finally, in late 2011, the Security Director of the Rio 2016 Organizing Committee, Dr. Luiz Fernando Corrêa visited the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) General Secretariat headquarters. INTERPOL provides a wide range of tools, databases, and services to its 190 member countries, and offers the deployment of INTERPOL Major Events Support Teams (IMESTs) for international events such as the World Cup and Olympic Games. Not only will the security responsibility during the Rio Olympics require Brazilian forces, but international cooperation as well.

Economic Considerations

Money invested in large events in Brazil, usually exceeds the allotted budget. In 2009, the Brazilian government fully approved the proposed budget of \$14.4 billion for organizing new stadiums, roads, and rail and airport infrastructure for the Olympic Games. In perspective, Tokyo's, Chicago's, and Madrid's combined estimate was \$14.8 billion. However, Brazil will renovate and reuse previous sports facilities from the 2007 Pan-American Games and 2014 World Cup.

Current Status

According to released data from the Institute of Public Security (ISP) of Brazil, for the month of January 2013, Rio de Janeiro's homicide rate dropped, while the crime rate increased in other parts of the Rio state. Since 1991, the homicide continues to drop annually in Rio. Many, including the Brazilian government and Rio citizens usually give credit to the "pacification" project. However, many still view the Brazilian police as violent and corrupt. In 2012, the police in São Paulo had an unfortunate record of killing one suspect for every 229 arrested. Another concern is the durability of the instituted

reform programs, including the maintenance of the UPP forces after the 2016 Olympic Games. The distrust in police units, and continued funding and “pacification” for UPPs in other cities, not just Rio, are problems that remain unsolved. The pacification project is not only a movement to decrease Rio’s crime rate, but the hope is to expand these beneficial effects to the entire country.

UPP Controversy

Though the majority of people agree that the UPP policing units are better alternative compared to the drug violence previously in the *favelas*, they still generate much controversy, especially in UPP selection and UPP violence. The UN Special Rapporteur Rolnik criticized the government’s choices of which *favelas* get to receive UPP units, pointing out that the government’s decisions are mainly concentrated upon the richer favelas and those surrounding the Olympic stadiums. In September 2013, residents of Brazil’s largest favela, Rocinha, brought allegations of violence and brutality to the State Council for the Defense of Human Rights. There is also criticism of the lack of investigation in the UPP’s role in people’s disappearances, such as the incident with Amarildo de Souza. Amarildo de Souza was a resident of Rio’s largest favela, Rocinha, and reportedly disappeared after being detained by UPP officers. In October 2013, a court ordered the arrest of UPP officers on charge for torturing and murdering Amarildo de Souza, but the officers claim that they have no connections to the man’s disappearance. Though the crime rate has decreased with the pacification, it is important to maintain the trust between the people and the UPPs.

Meeting Deadlines

During the Confederations Cup, there were many demonstrations throughout Brazil, protesting the quality of public services, corruption, and costs of the World Cup and

Olympic Games. Protesters are unhappy with lack of transparency, the high costs of investment of venue construction, and the probability that the venues will go unused after the Olympics and World Cup. In November 2013, the French riot police trained the Brazilian police forces in anticipation of public protests at these two events. The International Olympic Committee arrived in Rio in late August to inspect the construction progress. The IOC is concerned about Rio’s delay in its construction schedule and flow of budgetary resources. After a crane accident that killed two workers at the São Paulo’s Arena Corinthians, the Brazilian government ordered a partial halt to the stadium’s construction, where the opening game in the 2014 World Cup is scheduled in June 2014. Brazil’s World Cup stadiums are behind construction schedule, unable to meet FIFA’s end-of-year deadline. The Brazilian government emphasizes that it wants to build long-term infrastructure improvements, but with the high costs and tight schedules, the public has its doubts. Brazil must be ready to deliver to its people and the world.

Current Analysis by Experts

According to Stephanie Gimenez Stahlberg, MA, a research associate with the Program on Poverty and Governance at the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford University, the UPP program works mainly because the focus is on police reformation. In her paper, “The Pacification of *Favelas* in Rio de Janeiro: Why the program is working and what are the lessons for other countries,” Stahlberg asserts that the UPP works by rebuilding the trust between Brazil’s police force and its people. Previously, the police force had negative review due to the easy bribery and corruption with the drug factions in the *favelas*. With the new implemented UPP program, Stahlberg concludes that proximity policing, a focus on hotspots, and improvements in governance of police agencies help reduce the violence in *favelas*. In addition, the new police training

includes a novel approach in ideological-training that focuses on areas such as sociology and human rights. The UPP police also establish a relationship between them and the community they are responsible for, which certainly does not hurt. Stahlberg also reinforces that the new salary increases plus cash bonuses motivate the police force to do their job properly.

The system, called the Integrated Areas for Public Security, or AISP, rewards those police with cash bonuses based upon performance, such as meeting crime reduction rate targets. Furthermore, the pacification of *favelas* works because of stresses on the prevention of crime and the investment in youth.

However, others argue that the new programs and police forces only attempt to “pacify” the favelas located near Olympic or World Cup venues such as the Maracanã Stadium in the South Zone, where the neighborhoods are wealthier. But according to Robert Muggah, a research director of the Igarapé Institute and a principal of the SecDev Group, and Ilona Szabo de Carvalho, the director of the Igarapé Institute, this favoritism is a myth. The two argue that though the government installed the first UPP unit in Dona Marta favela in the South Zone, they also extended the pacification program to the East Zone in the City of God and Batan. Out of the 30 pacified *favela* areas, 23 are outside of the South Zone.

In addition, Muggah and Szabo de Carvalho’s view on the newfound relationship and training for the UPP units is similar to Stahlberg’s. The pacification does not only mollifies these gang controlled favelas, but also the Brazilian police force. The program tries to bring the police and civilians closer. Since 2008, over 8,000 police officers have been exposed to the new officer ideology training, which includes reinforcements in human rights and community policing. As the State Secretary of Public Security says, “Over decades we have trained a police to make war,

not to provide services. Now instead of having warriors we have service providers.”

Julia Tierney, a B.A. in Latin American Studies from Yale University, and M.A. in International Relations and Economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and M.A. in City Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote her master paper on “Peace Through the Metaphor of War: From Police Pacification to Governance Transformation in Rio de Janeiro.” Tierney spent four months in eleven pacification police units in 2011 and 2012. Her thesis focuses on how the new Police Pacification Units are transforming the people’s view of the state. The program helps to transform the understanding and experience of urban governance in these *favela* neighborhoods. An improvement in urban security is not only for the future security of Rio’s visitors and citizens, but also the overall reputation of governance.

Conclusion

Security is vital for the success of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. Throughout history, the International Olympic Committee made decisions to cancel Olympiads based upon the safety of the masses. Brazil has the opportunity to host many major sports events before the Olympic Games, including the 2013 Confederation Cup and 2014 World Cup, where security measures can be tested. Rio de Janeiro’s security problems mainly consist of crime in the drug faction controlled “ungovernable” *favelas*. The Brazilian government implemented programs such as the Pacification Police Units to recover these slums, and slowly rebuild the relationship between the police and the citizens. In recent years, people give credit to the UPP program for the drop in homicides in Rio. After the 2016 Olympics, some worry that the pacification project will discontinue, and argue that the UPP program should be spread to other areas. Thus, delegates should keep in

mind how to implement effective and durable programs.

Questions to Consider

1. How can we pacify the fear of resurgence in crime after the Olympics?
2. What can be done to ensure a continuing trend of decreased crime?
3. What is the role of the police force in Rio?
4. What possibly security threats could present themselves in a large scale event such as the Olympic Games?
5. What is the role of the people in maintaining Olympic security?
6. Given the recent events dealing with governmental surveillance, what is the extent of actions that could be considered “defense”?

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- <http://www.interpol.int/en> – The International Police Organization’s website
- <http://www.olympic.org/ioc> – The official website for the International Olympic Committee

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